Littler Lightbulb – February Employment Appellate Roundup

This Littler Lightbulb highlights some of the more significant employment law developments in the federal courts of appeal in the last month.

Another First Circuit Decision Granting Summary Judgment for the Employer on Vaccination Religious Exemption Claim

Melino v. Bos. Med. Ctr., 127 F.4th 391 (1st Cir. 2025) involved a claim for religious discrimination in violation of Title VII after the plaintiff’s employer denied her request for a religious exemption from a hospital’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement and terminated her for refusing to be vaccinated. The district court granted summary judgment for the hospital, finding that even if the plaintiff had established a bona fide religious belief exempting her from compliance with the hospital’s vaccine requirement, an exemption would have imposed undue hardship on the hospital.  The First Circuit agreed. As in Rodrique v. Hearst Commc'ns, Inc., 126F.4th 85 (1st Cir. 2025), discussed in the January Employment Appellate Roundup, the First Circuit found that the employer’s policy was based on objective, scientific information, including the CDC's recommendations that vaccines mitigated the effects and spread of COVID-19. Affirming summary judgment, the court agreed with the employer that permitting the plaintiff to work unvaccinated would have posed an undue hardship for the hospital "by increasing the risk of COVID-19 transmission amongst staff and patients."

Second Circuit Defines Standard of Proof in Whistleblower Retaliation Case

The plaintiff in Murray v. UBS Securities LLC, __ F.4th __ (2d Cir. Feb. 10, 2025), filed suit for whistleblower retaliation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1514A when he was terminated after he claimed that he complained to a supervisor that he was pressured in his research reports by other employees in violation of Securities and Exchange Commission regulations. The statute required him to show that his whistleblowing was a “contributing factor” in his termination. The case went to trial, and the jury was instructed that a “contributing factor” is one that “tend[s] to affect [an employment decision] in any way.” The plaintiff prevailed at trial. 

The matter went to the Second Circuit, which reversed, and after a remand from the Supreme Court (which had reversed the Second Circuit’s prior order vacating the jury award), the Second Circuit found that the jury instruction regarding a “contributing factor” was overbroad and too abstract. In determining whether whistleblowing was a contributing factor in an employee’s termination, the court stated, the jury must decide whether the whistleblowing activity was actually at least “partly responsible for” the adverse employment action, not just whether it “tended to” affect the decision. “A termination is not because of whistleblowing just because whistleblowing has a propensity to lead to termination,” the court stated. Moreover, the court stated, “whistleblowing may also ‘affect’ a termination ‘in any way’ without playing a part in making it happen.”

Because the jury instruction misstated the plaintiff’s burden of proof and allowed the jury to hold the employer liable for retaliation without finding that whistleblowing actually contributed to his termination, the Second Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court.

Sixth Circuit Upholds Summary Judgment for Employer in ERISA Claim

Kramer v. Am. Elec. Power Exec. Severance Plan, __ F.4th __ (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 2025), involved a claim to recover benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). When an employee benefits plan grants its administrator discretion to make eligibility determinations and to construe the plan, courts review an administrator’s denial of benefits under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard, the court stated.  Under that standard, an administrator’s decision is not arbitrary or capricious “if it is the result of a deliberate, principled reasoning process supported by substantial evidence,” the Sixth Circuit held. In this case there was substantial evidence that the plaintiff was terminated for cause based on expense account irregularities in violation of company rules. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit upheld summary judgment for the employer finding the decision denying the employee benefits under the plan was not arbitrary and capricious.

Eleventh Circuit Addresses Standard for Summary Judgment in Federal-Sector Discrimination Cases

In Rosado v. Sec'y, Dep't of the Navy, 127 F.4th 858 (11th Cir. 2025), the Eleventh Circuit explained the different standards for summary judgment in federal-sector discrimination cases in contrast to private-sector discrimination cases under Title VII. Federal-sector discrimination statutes don’t require employees to establish but-for causation for the challenged action, the court stated. Rather, to defeat summary judgment for the employer a federal employee must only show that protected characteristics “played any part” in the employer’s decision-making.

Even under this lower standard, the court found, the plaintiff in this case failed to establish discrimination in promotion decisions based on race, national origin, and age, and in retaliation for his complaints of discrimination. Among other things, the panel members evaluating the plaintiff’s application for promotion to one of the positions did not know plaintiff’s age, date of birth, national origin, or prior EEO activity.  As to the other positions for which the plaintiff applied, the court found the evidence demonstrated the applicants selected for the positions were more qualified than the plaintiff. Regarding plaintiff’s retaliation claims, the same standard for summary judgment applied. The plaintiff need only show that retaliation “somehow figured into the process” that led to the final decision, the court stated. Examining the evidence, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to show that retaliatory animus “played any part” in any of the employment decisions he challenged.

Information contained in this publication is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or opinion, nor is it a substitute for the professional judgment of an attorney.